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CREATIVITY, IMPROVISATION, AND RISK:
COPYRIGHT AND MUSICAL INNOVATION
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa*
The goals and beneficiaries of copyright frame-works have long been con-
tested in varied contexts. Copyright is often treated as a policy tool that gives
creators incentives to create new works. Incentive theories of copyright often
emphasize appropriability, which enables copyright owners to ensure that they
profit from their copyrighted works by exercising control over uses of and access
to, such works. Although copyright clearly imposes costs in the form of restric-
tions on access to copyright-protected works and inefficiencies in the form of
deadweight loss, the benefits of copyright are thought by many to outweigh the
costs. Copyright discussions may at least implicitly assume that copyright
frameworks, and the control rights that accompany such frameworks, increase
creativity. However, little is actually known about the extent to which copyright
increases creativity. Further, conceptualizations of creativity within legal dis-
cussions remain vague. Copyright discussions often pay significant attention to
the risks to ownership for copyright owners posed by potential users and uses of
copyright protected works. However, a focus on risks to ownership may obscure
the presence of other types of risk in copyright contexts. Copyright control mech-
anisms may also pose significant risks to creativity and innovation because
they may not sufficiently acknowledge the importance of uses of existing works
as a creative force. Musical innovation, for example, has come in many
instances from creators taking creative risks through uses of existing materials
in ways that do not fit well within dominant copyright assumptions about
creativity. Creators operating within such creative paradigms may expose them-
selves to greater legal risks as a result of their uses of copyright protected mate-
© 2011 Olufunmilayo B. Arewa. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this article in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law and Anthropology, University of California, Irvine School of
Law. A.B., Harvard College, M.A., Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley (Anthro-
pology); A.M., University of Michigan (Applied Economics); J.D., Harvard Law
School. Email: oarewa@law.uci.edu. For their helpful comments, I am indebted to
participants in the Creativity and the Law Symposium at the University of Notre Dame
Law School.
1829
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
rial. Copyright discourse would benefit from greater attention to potential
dangers that copyright frameworks might pose for creativity and innovation.
Further, greater consideration should be given to the extent to which risks taken
by creators in the creative process, evident in practices such as improvisation,
may foster creativity.
INTRODUCTION
Although copyright has expanded to artistic practices that neces-
sarily involve more than the visual, a visual-textual bias in copyright
has remained. The expansion of copyright to music underscores
potential incompatibilities in applying visual copyright to an artistic
practice, such as music, that is both oral and aural. In fact, music
creation does not require writing, but may include oral and, at times,
written traditions. Courts in music copyright cases give primacy to vis-
ual, written aspects of music and typically assume that oral musical
expressions fall into the category of a performance, which is in turn
assumed to derive from and be secondary to an underlying written
musical composition. The visual bias in music copyright has become
more problematic in the post-sound-recording era, when copyright
increasingly protects things other than written musical expression.
Further, the twentieth-century displacement in the popular music
arena of European-based music by African-based music, which often
embeds significant elements of oral music traditions, particularly chal-
lenges music copyright's visual assumptions.
I. COPYRIGHT, CREATVITY, AND RISK
A. The Goals of Copyright
The Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution pro-
vides that: "The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries."' The authority for copyright thus embeds two key
concepts that have long been a focus of intellectual property scholar-
ship: progress/innovation and the rights of authors. Authors' rights
have been typically conceived of as a type of property right,2 hence
"intellectual property," but could, in reality, be structured in a num-
ber of different ways.
1 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
2 See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657 (1834) ("That an author,
at common law, has a property in his manuscript... cannot be doubted .... ).
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From the perspective of artistic practice, the scope of effective
control encompassed within ideas of authors' rights has always been
highly mutable, particularly in the music arena.3 Music compositional
practices have varied both over time and among genres in ways that
should be more explicitly recognized in copyright considerations of
music. For example, early Renaissance music contained composi-
tional and performance practices more akin to jazz,4 while nine-
teenth-century music came to embody what became dominant
copyright assumptions about the priority of written compositions and
fidelity to written musical texts in performance. 5 Creation practices in
the music arena reflect highly varied approaches to musical creation
in which borrowing has been a norm in all genres and time periods.
6
Although creators of music may borrow for different reasons, 7 the per-
vasive nature of musical borrowing has significant implications for
copyright treatment of musical creativity.
8
In addition to incorporating assumptions about the nature of
artistic creativity, copyright frameworks also embed both explicit and
implicit assumptions about the relationship between authors' owner-
ship rights and innovation. A pervasive assumption exists, for exam-
ple, that copyright gives incentives to innovate that result in greater
production of artistic works.9 Such greater production may be con-
ceived of in both quantitative and qualitative terms.10 In contrast to
3 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Writing Rights: Performance, Composition, and
Copyright's Visual Bias 24 (Jan. 18, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (discussing changing conceptions of musical creation that became more per-
vasive in the nineteenth century with the sacralization of the classical music canon).
4 See PETER VAN DER MERWE, ROOTS OF THE CLAssIcAL 73 (2004).
5 See Arewa, supra note 3, at 21, 24.
6 SeeJ. Peter Burkholder, Borrowing, in 4 THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC
AND MUSICIANS 5, 5-36 (Stanley Sadie ed., 2d ed. 2001).
7 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From j.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copy-
right and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REv. 547, 604-05 (2006) (discussing reasons com-
posers might borrow in the compositional process); Howard Mayer Brown, Emulation,
Competition, and Homage: Imitation and Theories of Imitation in the Renaissance, 35 J. Am.
MUSICOLOGICAL SOC'Y 1, 48 (1982) (noting that musical emulation may arise from a
sense of competition or a desire "to pay homage to an older master").
8 See Arewa, supra note 7, at 550-52.
9 See Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1197,
1202-03 (1996) (noting the prominence of incentive language in Supreme Court
copyright cases).
10 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RicHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 212 (2003) ("The more extensive that protection is, the
greater the incentive to create intellectual property . . . ."); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 471, 475 (2003)
("[A] n absence of copyright protection for intangible works may lead to inefficiencies
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the patent arena, however, the impact of copyright frameworks on the
production of works is not well understood, although recent scholar-
ship has increasingly addressed questions relating to copyright and
the production of works." The impact of copyright on the produc-
tion and consumption of works and creativity, more generally, is
multifaceted. 12
Questions of quantity and quality are potentially complex and
intertwined in varied copyright contexts. In addition to unanswered
questions about the impact of copyright on the production of works,
the extent to which copyright enhances artistic innovation and creativ-
ity remains under-explored. Further, how to appropriately determine
what constitutes innovation remains uncertain in a broad range of
artistic contexts. Creativity is one potential metric by which to mea-
sure artistic innovation. However, conceptions of creativity in the law
remain nebulous and in many instances incompatible with actual crea-
tive practices in varied contexts.13 What constitutes creativity may also
be quite subjective and depend to a significant degree on the eye of
the beholder. Certain types of creativity are, however, disfavored by
legal frameworks, which incorporate ideas about creativity heavily
because ...of impaired incentives to invest in maintaining and exploiting these
works.").
11 See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku et al., Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An
EmpiricalAnalysis of Copyright's Bounty, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1669, 1671-75 (2009) (testing
the hypothesis that increased copyright protection increases the number of copy-
righted works produced and finding that this hypothesis is often not true in many
cases); Mark S. Nadel, How Current Copyright Law Discourages Creative Output: The Over-
looked Impact of Marketing, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 785, 789 (2004) (noting that copy-
right's prohibition against unauthorized copying is not necessary to stimulate an
optimal level of new creations and in fact appears to have a net negative effect on
creative output).
12 See Paul J. Heald, Property Rights and the Efficient Exploitation of Copyrighted Works:
An Empirical Analysis of Public Domain and Copyrighted Fiction Bestsellers, 92 MINN. L. REV.
1031, 1034 (2008) ("[C]opyright extension imposes dead weight losses without offset-
ting efficiency gains."); see also [ANDES & POSNER, supra note 10, at 38 (noting that
certain copyright laws "reduce the incentive to create intellectual property by prevent-
ing the author or artist from shifting risk to the publisher or dealer"); PaulJ. Heald,
Testing the Over- and Under-Exploitation Hypothesis: Bestselling Musical Composi-
tions (1913-32) and Their Use in Cinema (1968-2007) 5-6 (Univ. of Chi., Pub. Law
& Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 234, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=I 115405 (finding that exploita-
tion rates of public domain songs and copyrighted songs are the same).
13 See R. KEITH SAWYER, EXPLAINING CREATIVITY 311 (2006) ("These [copyright
and patent] laws are based on obsolete myths about creativity"); Keith Negus, Cultural
Production and the Corporation: Musical Genres and the Strategic Management of Creativity in
the US Recording Industry, 20 MEDIA, CULTURE & Soc'V 359, 362 (1998) (discussing dif-
ferent interpretations of creativity).
1832 [VOL. 86:5
COPYRIGHT AND MUSICAL INNOVATION
influenced by autonomous romantic author conceptions that do not
take sufficient account of the inherendy collaborative nature of crea-
tion in a wide range of creative contexts.
1 4
B. Musical Copyright and Visual-Textual Bias
Romantic author influenced conceptions of creativity in the
music arena tend to lead to a focus on written aspects of musical
expression. As a result of this focus on musical writings, copyright
fails to include the full range of actual musical creativity. Copyright
views of musical creativity contain a significant degree of visual-textual
bias.' 5 This visual-textual bias constrains copyright in important ways
that prevent copyright frameworks from encompassing musical crea-
tivity in its fullest. Visual bias emerges from three primary factors: his-
torical, linguistic/semiotic, and cognitive. 16 The historical factors that
have shaped visual bias are, in part, a consequence of the technologi-
cal realities of music preservation prior to the sound-recording era.
Although not immediately commercialized for music, sound
recording technology became available following Thomas Edison's
1877 development of tinfoil phonograph technology. 17 Prior to the
development of sound reproduction technology, music was generally
preserved tangibly in writing and intangibly in human memory. Copy-
right, which originally protected literary and other writings, was thus
initially based on protection of written musical compositions, which
include musical notes and, in some cases, lyrics.' 8 Music is also a per-
formance art, which has bearing on musical creativity, particularly
once sound recording technologies permitted preservation of oral
aspects of musical creativity evident in performance. Technological
realities thus meant that musical copyright initially came to protect
14 See SAWYER, supra note 13, at 311 ("But most creative products are collabora-
tively created, and most of them are built out of existing ideas and components.");
Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity, in The
Construction of Authorship 29, 40 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994)
("Copyright law, with its emphasis on rewarding and safeguarding 'originality,' has
lost sight of the cultural value of what might be called 'serial collaborations'-works
resulting from successive elaborations of an idea or text by a series of creative workers,
occurring perhaps over years or decades.").
15 See Arewa, supra note 3, at 37-42.
16 See id. at 18 n.88, 20, 28-29 n.1 75 .
17 See CHARLES BAzERmAN, THE LANGUAGES OF EDISON'S LIGHT 130 (1999).
18 See Michael W. Carroll, Whose Music Is It Anyway?: How We Came to View Musical
Expression as a Form of Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1405, 1405-09 (2004) (discussing the
history of copyrights in music).
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musical writings.19 Actual musical creative practices, however, demon-
strate the extent to which all music, including European classical
music, contains both written and oral traditions.2 0
How copyright came to protect music is an important factor in
understanding persistent views of musical creativity. The early history
of music copyright also reflects a trajectory in which initial concerns
about unauthorized copying and distribution of completed works
later came to shape conceptions on the creation side such that copy-
ing in creation became increasingly disfavored during the nineteenth
century and subject to increasingly sacralized views of musical
creativity.
21
The extension of copyright protection to music in eighteenth
century Britain highlights continuing issues of concern in music copy-
right. The Statute of Anne, 22 an early copyright statute that specifically
refers to books and writings, 23 was not at first thought to cover musical
compositions. 24 Although the Statute of Anne did not initially protect
musical compositions, 25 the unauthorized use of music was an issue of
great concern to music publishers who traded accusations of piracy.
26
Composers struggled with publishers in the eighteenth century both
to prevent unauthorized publication of their works and to increase
the low economic returns offered to them by publishing houses.
27
19 See id.; Charles Cronin, Virtual Music Scores, Copyright and the Promotion of a
Marginalized Technology, 28 COLUM.J.L. & ARTS 1, 6 (2004) ("To remain rational, copy-
right law changes to accommodate new technologies involved in the creation, distri-
bution and consumption of works of authorship that copyright protects.").
20 STANLEY SADIE & VLADIMIR ASHKENAZY, THE BILLBOARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CLASSI-
CAL Music 8 (2004) (noting that Western classical music relies on both oral and writ-
ten traditions).
21 See Arewa, supra note 3, at 22.
22 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
23 Although the preamble of the Statute of Anne refers to books and writings, the
remainder of the statute refers only to books.
24 See Martin Kretschmer & Friedemann Kawohl, The History and Philosophy of Cop-
yright, in Music AND COPYRIGHT 21, 27 (Simon Frith & Lee Marshall eds., 2d ed. 2004)
("Music was not thought to be protected under the Statute of Anne.").
25 See Martin Kretschmer, Intellectual Property in Music: A Historical Analysis of Rheto-
ric and Institutional Practices, 6 STUD. CULTURE, ORGS. & SOC''S 197, 207 (2000)
("Music was not protected under the Act of Anne.").
26 See id. ("Although unauthorized publication of a composer's work was not ille-
gal, hefty accusations of piracy flew between publishers."); see also Kretschmer &
Kawohl, supra note 24, at 27.
27 See Michael W. Carroll, The Struggle for Music Copyright, 57 FLA. L. REv. 907,
958-61 (2005) (discussing efforts to expand copyright); David Hunter, Music Copy-
right in Britain to 1800, 67 Music & LETTERS 269, 272-77 (1986) (noting the difficulties
of composers to earn a living); Kretschmer, supra note 25, at 207-08 (discussing rela-
tionships between music publishers and composers); Nancy A. Mace, Haydn and the
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These early struggles between composers and their publishers fore-
shadowed conflicts that continue to the present.
28
Publishers and composers in the pre-copyright era used a num-
ber of methods to control uses of musical works. Rather than lobby
for statutory protection, eighteenth-century music publishers used
market control mechanisms to protect their rights, including control
of distribution and predatory pricing against new entrants. 29 Beetho-
ven is said to have made his piano sonatas exceptionally difficult so as
to control uses by others. 30 Low payments to composers were also typ-
ical, and composers "often suffered the chagrin of seeing publishers
grow rich."3 1 Some resorted to other methods to control uses of
music, including through exercise of control over distribution of
music scores. 32 As music director of the city of Hamburg from 1721 to
1767, composer Georg Philipp Telemann, who could not charge for
church concerts, used guards to prevent those without printed copies
of the Passion "performed" from entering the church.
33
The "most important sources of income for successful, indepen-
dent composers" such as Handel and Mozart were "commissions, dedi-
cations[,] and performances of new compositions" rather than
publishing revenues. 34 Other composers resorted to self-publishing to
increase income in light of the low returns offered by publishing
houses.35 In the nineteenth century, "full scores and instrumental
London Music Sellers: Forster v. Longman & Broderip, 77 Music & LETTERS 527, 529-39
(1996) (discussing the Forster case); Ronald J. Rabin & Steven Zohn, Arne, Handel,
Walsh, and Music as Intellectual Property: Two Eighteenth-Century Lawsuits, 120 J. RoYAL
MUSICAL Ass'N 112, 112-14 (1995) (discussing "the difficulties encountered by those
who wished to protect music");John Small, j.C. Bach Goes to Law, 126 MUSICAL TIMES
526, 526-29 (1985) (discussing Bach's experience with copyright law).
28 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, YouTube, UGC, and Digital Music: Competing Business
and Cultural Models in the Internet Age, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 431, 454-59 (2010) (discuss-
ing the relative distribution of economic returns in the contemporary music industry
and noting that top grossing musicians earn more from concert and performance
revenues than they do from copyright royalties); Carroll, supra note 27, at 958-61
(discussing legal reform initiated by modern musicians).
29 See Hunter, supra note 27, at 275-78.
30 See F.M. SCHERER, QUARTER NOTES AND BANK NoTEs 170-71 (2004).
31 See Hunter, supra note 27, at 275.
32 Cronin, supra note 19, at 1 ("Wolfgang [Amadeus Mozart]'s redoubtable intel-
lect undermined the Vatican's exclusive control over the dissemination of Gregorio
Allegri's Miserere, the score of which was then closely guarded, and performances of
which the pope allowed only within the Sistine Chapel.").
33 See Kretschmer, supra note 25, at 208.
34 Id.
35 See id. at 207-08 (noting that successful popular song composer, Charles
Dibdin, avoided London's "publishing oligopoly" through self-publishing).
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parts for operas and some large symphonic works," which would need
to be acquired by anyone who planned to perform the opera or sym-
phonic work, "were often printed but not published, so that the owner
could more effectively demand royalties or specify conditions of
performance."
5 6
In 1777, the Bach v. Longman3 7 case clarified that the Statute of
Anne did apply to musical works.3 8 Three possible legal grounds
existed for a copyright action at the time of Bach: the copyright act
(Statute of Anne), common law, and a royal privilege-none of which
provided reliable grounds for music copyright.39 The Bach case arose
when two leaders of the London music scene, 40 Johann Christian
Bach, youngest son ofJohann Sebastian Bach, and composer and viola
da gamba virtuoso Carl Friedrich Abel, sought to bring a test case
against music publishers Charles Longman and James Lukey.41 The
suit was brought in 1773 in Chancery Court by Bach, who had a
longer term remaining on his royal privilege than did Abel.42 Based
on his royal privilege, 43 Bach sought injunctive relief for unauthorized
editions of two Bach compositions-a lesson for the Harpsichord or
Piano Forte and a sonata for the keyboard and viola da gamba-by
Longman & Lukey, "a publisher with whom both [Bach and Abel]
had been in dispute." 44
Bach, who was a prominent composer, had been one of some
sixteen composers to obtain a royal privilege, 45 which, in Bach's case,
36 D.W. Krummel, Music Publishing, in Music PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 79, 79-80
(D.W. Krummel & Stanley Sadie eds., 1990).
37 (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (KB.).
38 See id. at 1275 (finding a musical composition to be a writing under the Statute
of Anne).
39 See Rabin & Zohn, supra note 27, at 115-16 (noting that the status of music
under the Statute of Anne was indeterminate and the legal fights of royal privilege
holders equally problematic); Small, supra note 27, at 527.
40 See Hunter, supra note 27, at 278-79 (noting that Abel and Bach were "proba-
bly the only composers with sufficient position to effect the changes necessary to pro-
vide composers with copyright protection equal to that enjoyed by authors").
41 See Carroll, supra note 27, at 942-44 .
42 See Hunter, supra note 27, at 279 (noting that Abel's privilege expired in
1774).
43 See Carroll, supra note 27, at 944 (noting that Bach's case initially relied princi-
pally on his printing privilege and possibly on common law copyright, but did not
mention the Statute of Anne).
44 Kretschmer, supra note 25, at 209; see also Hunter, supra note 27, at 278-82
(describing the background of Bach v. Longman); Small, supra note 27, at 527 (citing
Bach's complaint).
45 See Carroll, supra note 27, at 930; Hunter, supra note 27, at 277; see also Kret-
schmer, supra note 25, at 206 (discussing rights given by Queen Elizabeth I).
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gave him the exclusive right to publish his works for fourteen years.
46
After the 1774 House of Lords decision in Donaldson v. Beckett,47 which
effectively "extinguish [ed] the common law copyright in published
works,"48 Bach, following the path of London booksellers petitioning
for relief from the loss of rights in books not protected by the Statute
of Anne, unsuccessfully petitioned the House of Commons to over-
turn Donaldson.49 The 1775 Court of Common Pleas decision in Sta-
tioners' Co. v. Carnan,50 which voided a royal privilege for almanacs,
51
led Bach to amend his case to add the Statute of Anne as a new basis
for granting injunctive relief.
52
The seminal Bach case thus came at a time of complexity and
uncertainty with respect to copyright generally. Bach and Abel
brought the suit with the intent to effect legal changes and provide
composers with copyright protection equal to that of authors.53 Fol-
lowing the case, music publishers began registering musical works,
54
which did not, however, lead to an improvement in composer earn-
ings.55 Rather, the litigation that followed was largely among publish-
ers themselves. 56 J.C. Bach did not live to see significant fruits from
the Bach case; he died a debtor in 1782, and his creditors unsuccess-
fully "attempted . . . to seize his body for sale to medical schools."
5 7
Outcomes for popular composers, even in the eighteenth century,
46 See Small, supra note 27, at 526.
47 (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.).
48 1 KEVIN GARNETT ET AL., COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT § 2-17, at
35 (15th ed. 2005).
49 See Small, supra note 27, at 528 (noting that Bach followed the lead of the
London booksellers and presented a petition for relief to the House of Commons
following the Donaldson v. Beckett judgment).
50 (1775) 96 Eng. Rep. 590 (C.P.).
51 See id. at 593 (voiding crown privilege granted for almanacs).
52 See Rabin & Zohn, supra note 27, at 115-16; see also Carroll, supra note 27, at
944 (discussing the influence of the Donaldson case on Bach's lawsuit).
53 See Kretschmer, supra note 25, at 209 (noting that the Donaldson v. Beckett case
inspired Bach and Abel to "launch a test case" against London publishers).
54 See Carroll, supra note 27, at 946 (noting that 175 music titles were registered
with the Stationers' Company between 1700 and 1779, growing to 738 from 1780 to
1789, and doubling again in the following decade).
55 See Hunter, supra note 27, at 281-82; Kretschmer, supra note 25, at 210.
56 See Kretschmer, supra note 25, at 210; Mace, supra note 27, at 539 (discussing a
case involving trios by a student of Haydn published under Haydn's name and how
the case "underlines the confused status of musical copyright in the last quarter of the
eighteenth century, when both composers and music sellers attempted to exploit the
weaknesses of existing legislation for their own benefit").
57 SCHERER, supra note 30, at 175.
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reflected a familiar pattern in which composers received limited sums
from sheet music sales. 58
The expansion of copyright to music evident in Bach is often
presented as a seemingly natural extension from literary writing to
musical writing. However, the expansion of copyright from covering
the word to covering the note has been far from smooth, in part due
to important differences between the literary and musical arts. The
expansion of copyright's scope is often presented as a list that gives a
date and type of material that became subject to copyright on the
given date. However, simply listing a date that copyright became
applicable to music just skims the surface of significant underlying
issues and complexities. As was the case with the application of copy-
right to other artistic forms such as photography, 59 music copyright
both reflected and had an impact on sociocultural contexts of musical
creation, dissemination, performance, and consumption. For exam-
ple, with the application of copyright to music came greater awareness
among composers that their work constituted intellectual property
that had economic value. 60 Further, recognition of the value of musi-
cal writing was an important factor in changes in power dynamics
between composers and performers, particularly in the opera arena.
As a result of such power shifts, by the end of the nineteenth century,
composers in the European art music arena were able to wrest power
from performers. 61 Visual bias-influenced copyright frameworks gave
composers significant power by ensuring that their status led to com-
mensurate potential copyright financial rewards. Not surprisingly,
composers such as Bach, Abel, Beethoven, and Hummel were strong
advocates of copyright protection. 6
2
58 See NICHOLAS E. TAWA, SWEET SONGS FOR GENTLE AMERICANS 116 (1980) (not-
ing that "composer[s] of highly popular songs rarely profited to any extent from
sheet-music sales" and that "[t]he most prominent musicians failed to garner more
than a pittance for their hits").
59 See Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright's Response to the
Invention of Photography, 65 U. Pirr. L. REV. 385, 454 (2004) (discussing the expansion
of copyright from books to new technologies, such as photography, that "have raised
serious issues over copying and control, but more important, [that have] often chal-
lenged the boundary of the subject matter with never-anticipated commodities").
60 See Hunter, supra note 27, at 272.
61 See, e.g., HILARY PoRIss, CHANGING THE ScoRE 3-4 (2009) (describing changing
practices in the nineteenth-century opera surrounding aria insertion and shifts in rel-
ative power between composers and performers).
62 SeeJoel Sachs, Hummel and the Pirates: The Struggle for Musical Copyright, 59 MuSI-
CAL Q. 31, 31-32 (1973); supra notes 28-56 and accompanying text; see generally F.M.
Scherer, The Emergence of Musical Copyright in Europe From 1709 to 1850 (HKS
1838 [VOL. 86:5
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In the European art music sphere, initial concerns about unau-
thorized distribution of musical works soon came to shape ideas about
musical creativity more generally. More specifically, the advent of
musical copyright came at a time of changing conceptions about musi-
cal creativity, particularly in the European art music genre. During
the nineteenth century, European art music became increasingly
characterized by sacralized notions of musical creativity that came to
emphasize particular views of originality. This process of sacralization
instilled norms in Western classical music that disfavored previously
commonplace practices such as improvisation, which was largely elimi-
nated from the Western classical tradition by the early twentieth cen-
tury.63 Other commonplace creative practices such as abridgement
and something somewhat akin to contemporary mashups, in which
new pieces were created from elements of existing works, were also
eliminated.64 Until the mid-nineteenth century, practices such as aria
insertion, in which performers could override written scores and sub-
stitute or add arias of their choosing, were pervasive in opera.
65
Taken together, a range of commonplace musical practices gave
authority for other composers and performers to change and modify
European art music for their own purposes. These practices dimin-
ished and were largely eliminated by the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury as European art music began to embody conceptions of the
musical work, the priority of written forms of music, and fidelity to the
written work in performance as norms in musical creativity.66
Sacralization had significant consequences for European art
music as a living musical tradition. Sacralization contributed to Euro-
pean art music becoming a museum tradition that came to feature the
work of dead and valorized great composers whose works should not
be changed.67 In contrast, as was the case with Western art music
when it was a living and vibrant musical tradition, living musical tradi-
Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. RWP08-052, 2008), avail-
able at http://web.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=315.
63 See Philip Tagg, Open Letter: 'Black Music,' 'Afro-American Music' and 'European
Music,' 8 POPULAR Music 285, 290 (1989) (noting that improvisation was virtually
eliminated from the European classical tradition by 1910).
64 See CHARLES HAMm, YESTERDAYS: POPULAR SONG IN AMERICA 71 (1979) (describ-
ing the opera Cinderella, a nineteenth-century English version of Gioachino Rossini's
opera La Cenerentola, created by Rophino Lacy, who retained most of Rossini's music,
but who also made "'copious additions' of music from other operas by the same com-
poser"); LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, HIGHBROw/LOWBROW 139 (1988) (noting that the
practice of abridgement was once commonplace in the nineteenth century).
65 See PoRiss, supra note 61, at 5.
66 See Arewa, supra note 3, at 22, 24.
67 See Arewa, supra note 7, at 589, 611.
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tions often involve interchange, reuse, borrowing, improvisation, and
other uses of existing works that may be inconsistent with sacralized
conceptions of creativity.
Changing nineteenth-century musical practices also have signifi-
cant copyright implications. This is particularly the case because copy-
right has come to embrace sacralized conceptions of musical creativity
that derive in part from dominant conceptions of creativity in the
European art music arena in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
The derivation and historical specificity of such assumed dominant
music creative practices are insufficiently recognized in copyright.
This is significant for a number of reasons. First and foremost, the
vision of musical creativity embedded in copyright is a poor fit for
actual musical practices, even in the European art music tradition,
particularly prior to the late nineteenth century. As a result, even par-
adigmatic creators in that tradition would be copyright violators
under contemporary copyright frameworks. The conception of the
derivative work, for example, which was added to U.S. copyright
frameworks in 187068 and expanded in the twentieth century, would
have inhibited creativity by composers such as Bach and Mozart-
both of whom were master improvisers, and both of whom borrowed
extensively in their works. 69 Further, actual creativity practices of such
composers were far more akin to contemporary musical creativity
practices than is often acknowledged. 70
C. Copyright and Creativity Risk
Copyright assumptions about musical creativity have import for
how copyright addresses questions of risk. For example, improvisa-
tion, which is a core aspect of musical creativity, is also largely disfa-
vored by copyright.71 Improvisation as musical practice often entails
68 See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198 (codified in scattered sections
of 17 U.S.C.), amended by International Copyright Act of 1891, ch. 565, § 4952 26 Stat.
1106 and Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 392, § 4963, 29 Stat. 694; Paul Goldstein, Derivative
Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'v U.S.A. 209, 214-15
(1983) (noting that Congress first granted derivative rights in 1870 and further
expanded the scope of derivative rights in the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts).
69 See Arewa, supra note 7, at 604.
70 See Neal Zaslaw, Mozart as a Working Stiff in ON MOZART 102, 103 (James M.
Morris ed., 1994) (citing the author's conversation with another participant at a con-
ference in Vienna on Mozart in which the author noted: "Mozart's music ascended
into the higher ether only in the course of the nineteenth century. During his life-
time, it was ight down on the ground along with that of the other composers.").
71 See infra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
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considerable levels of artistic risk-taking. 72 Improvisational practices
are also closely associated with innovation and creativity in varied con-
texts.73 The creative risks that may be inherent in improvisational
practices clearly fall within the goals of copyright and should, in fact,
be encouraged by copyright frameworks. Copyright largely fails to
facilitate the creation of improvised works,7 4 in large part due to the
ways in which copyright frameworks conceptualize and frame ques-
tions of risk in artistic contexts. Copyright discourse would benefit
from greater attention to potential dangers that copyright frameworks
might pose for creativity and innovation. Further, greater considera-
tion should be given to the extent to which risks taken by creators in
the creative process, evident in practices such as improvisation, may
actually foster creativity.
Visual-textual bias in copyright leads copyright to concentrate to
a significant degree on allocation property rights based largely on
written musical texts. From a risk management perspective, copyright
comes with a pervasive focus on threats to ownership and compensa-
tion for creators of written musical works. Consequenly, copyright
focuses to a significant extent on the implications of activities charac-
terized as infringing the rights of authors and owners of musical and
other works. This focus reflects the seeming ease of allocating and
monitoring property interests in written texts, as well as a customarily
traditionalist cast in the legal profession, which has a higher comfort
level dealing with seemingly fixed written artistic texts. The seeming
ease of this endeavor is, however, highly deceptive. For example, col-
laborativity in actual creative practices in music challenge our ability
72 See Lee B. Brown, Musical Works, Improvisation, and the Principle of Continuity, 54
J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 353, 354, 365 (1996) (noting the risks inherent in
improvisation).
73 See FrankJ. Barrett, Creativity and Improvisation in Jazz and Organizations: Implica-
tions for Organizational Learning, 9 ORG. Sci. 605, 617 (1998); CharlesJ. Limb & Allen
R. Braun, Neural Substrates of Spontaneous Musical Performance: An fMRI Study of Jazz
Improvisation, 3 PLoS ONE 1, 3 (2008), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC2244806 (using brain imaging techniques to map brain functions
of accomplished jazz pianists and finding "highly congruous pattern of activations and
deactivations in prefrontal cortex, sensorimotor and limbic regions of the brain" and
that "[t ] his unique pattern may offer insights into cognitive dissociations that may be
intrinsic to the creative process: the innovative, internally motivated production of
novel material (at once rule based and highly structured) that can apparently occur
outside of conscious awareness and beyond volitional control").
74 See Marshall J. Nelson, Jazz and Copyright: A Study in Improvised Protection, 21
COPYRIGHT L. Symp. (ASCAP) 35, 38 (1974); Note, Jazz Has Got Copyright Law and That
Ain't Good, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1940, 1941 (2005) (noting that copyright law provides
little protection for improvised material, which "discourages vital reinterpretation" in
musical forms such as jazz).
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to allocate rights and make determinations about how to treat similar
works when infringement is alleged.
75
Although ownership risk is highly relevant to copyright, other
types of risk exist in contexts of musical and other creations that
should be better identified and incorporated into copyright discourse.
As a result, in addition to ownership risk, copyright policy discussions
should also take account of creativity risk and legal risk. Assessments
of creativity risk would need to evaluate the extent to which copyright
frameworks may themselves pose risks to creativity. In the case ofjazz
and other musical forms in which improvisatory practices are perva-
sive, copyright frameworks may themselves pose a severe risk to crea-
tivity by virtue of how such frameworks treat forms of creative practice
that fall outside sacralized conceptions of artistic creation. In addi-
tion to risks to creativity, copyright discourse should also consider the
legal risks of copyright frameworks, particularly as those risks relate to
varied types of creators, particularly those who are not lawyers and
who may not have ready access to or funds to pay legal advisors. The
creativity risks posed by existing frameworks are closely associated with
potentially high levels of legal risks for artists working within disfa-
vored creative paradigms. In some instances, this has led to signifi-
cant mismatches between copyright assumptions and actual artistic
practice.
7 6
II. TECHNOLOGY, IMPROVISATION, AND MUSICAL INNOVATION
A. "Writing" Sounds: Nonvisual Musical Technologies and Copyright
Technological changes in the sound recording era have exacer-
bated the potential mismatch between copyright assumptions and cre-
ative practices. Prior to the advent of sound recordings, writing was a
primary method by which copyrightable musical expression was pre-
served. With the advent of sound recordings, oral musical expressions
could also be recorded and preserved. Copyright law has been modi-
fied to address nonvisual musical technologies such as sound record-
ings. For example, the Copyright Act of 190977 added a mechanical
license provision intended to address concerns about copying of musi-
cal compositions by the emerging player piano and sound recording
75 See SAWYER, supra note 13, at 311; Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy:
Copyright, Creation, and Context, 41 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 477, 482 (2007).
76 See Arewa, supra note 7, at 555-57 (discussing inexact fit of copyright for
music).
77 Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, repealed by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-554, 90 Stat. 2541.
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industries.78 Limited copyright protection for sound recordings was
added in 1972. 79 But despite these modifications, recognition of the
full implications of musical reproduction technologies based on
sound rather than musical writings for underlying copyright assump-
tions remains elusive.
The continuing assumption of priority of written musical expres-
sion means that oral expressions of music, including in live perform-
ance and sound recordings, are assumed to derive from an underlying
written musical expression. 80 In contrast, in the popular music arena,
the reverse is often the case. Music may thus be created in a studio,
with the writing serving as a reduction of the original oral musical
expression. 81 These and other dominant nonvisual musical practices
continue to challenge copyright frameworks that continue to reflect
questionable assumptions about the relationship between written and
oral musical expressions. Incomplete appreciation of the implications
of oral musical expression for copyright is a major source of continu-
ing tension in music copyright.
B. Copyright, Improvisation, and Musical Innovation
Copyright treatment of improvisation highlights the inexact fit of
copyright for musical practices in living musical traditions. The con-
ception of the derivative work, for example, which has broadened sig-
nificantly since its introduction to U.S. copyright law in 1870, is
fundamentally in tension with improvisatory and other common prac-
tices in living musical traditions. Derivative works, which potentially
include any work based on an existing work,8 2 clearly encompass
improvisatory works in ways that may make determinations of infringe-
ment difficult for practicing artists and potentially contested and
78 See Arewa, supra note 28, at 465.
79 See Sound Recording Amendment Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391
(amending the Copyright Act to provide for the creation of a limited copyright in
sound recordings for various purposes, including protecting against unauthorized
duplication and piracy of sound recordings).
80 See Arewa, supra note 3, at 34.
81 See generally Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Blues Lives: Promise and Perils of Musical
Copyright, 27 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 573, 592, 601 (2010) (discussing recordings in
the blues genre).
82 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining a derivative work as "a work based upon
one or more preexisting works"); Williams v. Broadus, No. 99 Civ. 10957 MBM, 2001
WL 984714, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2001) ("[A] work is not derivative simply because
it borrows from a pre-existing work.... When deciding whether a work is derivative by
[§ 101], courts have considered whether the work 'would be considered an infringing
work' if the pre-existing material were used without permission." (quoting M.H. Segal
Ltd. v. Hasbro, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 512, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
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unclear in practice. Further, conceptions of what constitute derivative
works are deeply rooted in sacralized assumptions about creativity that
fail to take sufficient account of creativity evident in musical collabora-
tions and practices such as improvisation.
Improvisation, which comes out of oral musical traditions, often
reflects spontaneous creative impulses.83 Improvisation is also consid-
ered "one of the few universals of music in which all cultures share in
one way or another."8 4 Improvisation is a critical practice in the artis-
tic arena because it can enable new artistic developments. 8 5 Improvi-
sation may play a role in niche creative communities in which new
artistic movements develop. The extent to which such communities
foster broader forms of creativity merits further examination. Late
twentieth-century music movements, including hip hop and punk, for
example, have in many instances been both highly improvisatory and
largely nonvisual in musical practice.8 6 Although copyright cases have
been better able to deal with the textual aspects of hip hop lyrics,
8 7
the nonvisual aspects of hip hop musical practices, including sam-
pling, are an uneasy fit for copyright. This reflects continuing difficul-
ties in applying copyright in contexts of musical borrowing more
generally.8
8
Niche musical communities may be highly influential, which
means that maintaining creativity in such communities may have
important commercial and noncommercial spillover effects. Hip hop
83 See Bruno Netti, Thoughts on Improvisation: A Comparative Approach, 60 MusicAL
QrLY 1, 3 (1974).
84 Id. at 4.
85 See Curtis L. Carter, Improvisation in Dance, 58 J. AESTHETICS & ART ClrTICISM
181, 181 (2000) (" [I] mprovisation is a means of suppressing historical consciousness
that is necessary to break the causal chain between existing conventions and new
developments in an artistic practice.").
86 See Ryan Snyder Ananat, Spectra of Singularity: Episodes of Improvisational
Lyricism from Hiphop to Pragmatism 21 (2009) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,
American Culture, University of Michigan) ("[L]yrics and beats make a music of
fusion that configures our experience through hiphop culture, organizing a common
way of life and a shared world of sounds in which improvisation plays a leading
role."); Timothy Dugdale, The French New Wave: New Again, in NEW PUNK CINEMA 56,
59 (Nicholas Rombes ed., 2005) (describing punk music as "collective improvisation
fuelled by cheek and frustration" and noting that "this improvisation involved taking
household objects, such as the safety-pin and rethinking their use in shocking and
disruptive ways").
87 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994) (basing deter-
mination of fair use largely on written lyrics of parody of Roy Orbison's and William
Dee's song "Oh, Pretty Woman").
88 See Arewa, supra note 7, at 550 (arguing that copyright "does not adequately
reflect the reality of musical borrowing").
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is a clear example of a noncommercial niche street culture that came
to have a significant global cultural impact.8 9 Similarly, punk music,
which began as a non-commercial subculture, 90 grew to have a global
impact. Although commercialization of both subcultures was not
uncontroversial, 9I the presence of such artistic movements highlights
the varied forms of musical creativity that may arise and flourish, at
times in unpredictable and unanticipated ways.
C. Copyright Context and Digital Era Collisions
The varied contexts of collaboration and creative practices evi-
dent in music underscore the need for copyright to encompass varied
types of creative practice to a far greater extent than has traditionally
been the case. Copyright must thus take account of the needs of
emerging artists as compared with established acts, as well as music
based in improvisation, borrowing and other forms of musical collabo-
ration. Copyright must also mediate among distinctions in a shifting
terrain of musical practice and frequently rapidly evolving technologi-
cal innovations.
The application of copyright to creative musical practices that
involve improvisation and other forms of borrowing have become all
the more important in the digital era. However, digital era contexts
in which such practices may develop are changing in essential ways.
Digital era shifts will likely increase collisions between formerly dis-
crete spheres of activity. For example, improvisation and creative
space previously existed alongside the commercial music sphere in an
environment in which technological realities made noncommercial,
niche creative movements difficult to commercialize without the
involvement of commercial intermediaries. As a result, a broad range
of cultural industry firms arose and garnered value in their role as
intermediaries. 92 In the digital era, however, the Internet has increas-
ingly led to significant collisions between commercial and non-com-
mercial milieus.93 Shifting contexts may also entail more aggressive
89 See M. Elizabeth Blair, Commercialization of the Rap Music Youth Subculture, in
THAT'S THE JOINT! 497, 497-98 (Murray Forman & Mark Anthony Neal eds., 2004)
(discussing the commercial success of hip-hop youth subculture).
90 See DICK HEBDIGE, SUBCULTURE 120-21 (1979) ("[T]he punks dislocated them-
selves from the parent culture and were positioned instead on the outside ... .
91 See Dugdale, supra note 86, at 60.
92 See Arewa, supra note 28, at 436.
93 See MATT MASON, THE PImATE'S DILEMMA 6 (2008) (noting that in the digital
era, "[i]llegal pirates, legitimate companies, and law-abiding citizens are now all in
the same space, working out how to share and control information in new ways").
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assertions of copyright and greater overt resistance to copyright in cer-
tain subcultures and artistic sectors.
CONCLUSION
Copyright frameworks that truly seek to enhance musical creativ-
ity must embed greater understanding of the varieties of musical cre-
ativities and practices. Such frameworks must also come to terms with
and ameliorate the most visible consequences of pervasive copyright
visual-textual bias. Addressing visual bias necessarily means modifying
current dominant views of performance in music copyright. Although
sound recordings may now be deposited and registered with the U.S.
Copyright Office, 9 4 copyright protection of such recordings remains
limited.9 5 Visual bias leads copyright frameworks to assume that the
creative locus of music is in the musical writing.9 6 Evidence from pop-
ular music forms today and European art music prior to the late nine-
teenth century suggests that this view of music and writing is
fundamentally incomplete.
Encompassing a fuller view of musical creativity in copyright
could start with recognition of the full range of musical activities
embedded in performance .97 Further, taking account of musical crea-
tivity will require better acknowledgment of the importance of
improvisation in musical creativity. Recognition of varied aesthetics of
creation and creativity are an important starting point from which
copyright could better deal with a fuller range of musical creativity.
Basing copyright on more authentic assumptions about musical
creativity can also play an important role in addressing both creativity
risk and legal risk. Copyright frameworks that reflect a broader range
of musical practice will facilitate creations by innovative musicians
who might otherwise be dissuaded from borrowing to create music
because of copyright conceptions that do not encompass their particu-
lar forms of creativity. Given that the topography of creativity may be
uncertain and unpredictable, copyright frameworks could do better to
enhance broader forms of creativity in music.
94 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION OF MUSICAL COMPOSI-
TIONS AND SOUND RECORDINGS, Copyright Circular 56A, at 2 (2009), available at http:/
/www.copyright.gov/circs/circ56a.pdf.
95 See Arewa, supra note 3, at 40 n.253.
96 See id. at 4.
97 Seeid. at 1.
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